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The institutional system of the European 
Communities is  difficult to classify.  The 
Community is much more than an inter-
governmental  organization:  its  Institu-
tions  have  a  definite  legal  status  and 
extensive powers of their own.  But nor, 
on  the  other  hand,  has  it  a  "federal 
government"  with  the  national govern-
ments and parliaments subordinate to it in 
the spheres of  its jurisdiction. It is perhaps 
safest to be non-committal and leave it to 
future  historians  to  fit  the  system  into 
one or other of the international lawyers' 
categories, ourselves saying simply that it 
is a "Community" system. 
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11 The four Institutions 
The  enlargement  of  the  European  Communities  on 
January 1,  1973,  to include the United Kingdom, Ireland 
and  Denmark*,  did  not  affect  the  basic  structure  and 
competence  of the  Communities'  four  institutions  - the 
European Parliament, the Council of Ministers; the Com-
mission and the Court of Justice- although their composi-
tion was altered. 
Until July  1967 the three Communities- the European 
Coal and Steel Community (set up in 1952), the European 
Economic  Community  (1958)  and  the  European  Atomic 
Energy Community (1958) -had separate executive Com-
missions (known as the High Authority in the ECSC) and 
Councils of Ministers, while the Parliament and Court had 
been competent for all three Communities since 1958. Since 
1967  there  has  been  a  single  Commission  and  a  single 
Council which exercise  all the powers and responsibilities 
formerly vested in their respective predecessors, in the same 
way and in accordance with the same rules, as laid down in 
the three Community Treaties. 
The merger of the Institutions was no more than a first 
step  towards  the  setting-up  of a  single  European  Com-
munity, governed by a single Treaty which will replace the 
Paris Treaty (establishing the ECSC) and the Rome Treaties 
(establishing the Common Market and Euratom). 
With the enlargement of the Community the number of 
seats in the European Parliament was increased from 142 to 
198. The total comprises 36 for each of the larger countries 
(France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom), 14 each 
for Belgium and the Netherlands, ten each for Ireland and 
Denmark,  and  six  for  Luxembourg.  Its  members  are 
appointed  by  the  nine  national  parliaments from  among 
their own members. 
The Council is made up of representatives of the govern-
ments of  the nine member states. Each government normally 
sends one of its ministers, though on occasions more than 
one minister may he  present.  Its membership  thus varies 
according to the matter up for consideration: the Foreign 
Minister  is  regarded  in  a  sense  as  his  country's  "main" 
representative  on  the  Council,  but Council  meetings  are 
often attended by the Ministers of Agriculture, Transport, 
Finance, Industry and so  on, usually on their own, some-
times alongside the Foreign Minister. 
The chairmanship  of the  Council  rotates  between  the 
member governments at six-monthly intervals in the follow-
ing order: Belgium,  Denmark, Germany, France, Ireland, 
Italy,  Luxembourg,  Netherlands,  United  Kingdom.  (The 
rota began in the first half of 1973 with Belgium.) 
When decisions are taken in the Council by majority vote 
the four larger countries have ten votes each, Belgium and 
*The original member states were Belgium, France, the German Federal Republic . Italy 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands.  • 
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the Netherlands five each,  Ir~land and Denmark three each 
and 'Luxembourg two. This makes a total of 58 votes. For a 
proposal to be passed by a qualified majority vote 41  votes 
in favour are needed where the Treaties require  ~cts of the 
Council to be adopted on a proposal from the Commission. 
In other circumstances, 41  votes in favour, cast by at least 
six member states, are· required. 
The  Council  is  assisted  by  a  Committee  of Permanent 
Representatives and by many groups of  experts. Comprising 
the  Permanent  Representatives  (ambassadors)  of  the 
member  states  to  the  Communities,  this  committee  has 
played an important role since 1958 in the work of  the EEC 
and Euratom (the ECSC did not hav~ a committee at this 
level).  The  merger  treaty  confirmed  its  existence  and its 
responsibility for preparing the deliberations of  the Council. 
The  Commission  consists  of 13  members,  appointed  by 
agreement between the member governments. Throughout 
their tenure of office the members must act in full indepen-
dence  both of the  governments  and of the  Council.  The 
Council cannot remove any member from office;  only the 
Parliament can if it wishes,  by passing a vote of censure, 
compel the Commission to resign as a body. 
The Court of Justice consists of nine judges appointed for 
terms of six  years by the common consent of the govern-
ments, who see to it that the action taken to implement the  • 
Treaties  is  in accordance  with  the rule  of law.  They  are- . 
assisted  in  reaching  their  decisions  by  four  advocates-
general. 
The  Council  and  the  Commission  are  assisted  by  the 
Economic and Social Committee (144  members)  for  Com-
mon  Market  and  Euratom  matters  and  the  Consultative 
Committee  (81  members)  for  ECSC  matters.  They  both, 
consist  of representatives  of various  sectors  of economic 
and social life (e.g. trade associations, unions, farmers). On 
many subjects they have to be consulted before a decision 
can be taken. The Economic and Social Committee can also 
submit opinions on its own initiative. In this way it helps to 
associate employers and workers with the progress of the 
Community. 
How  the Council and Commission work 
In implementation of the Treaty of Paris, the Commission 
can  issue  decisions,  recommendations  and  opinions. 
Decisions are binding in every respect; recommendations are 
binding as to ends but not as  to means; opinions are not 
binding. 
The Council acts in ECSC affairs mainly at the request of 
the Commission, either stating its views on particular issues 
or giving the endorsement without which  in certain matters 
the Commission cannot proceed.  '  ' . 
The Commission's ECSC decisions are mostly individual 
in scope; sometimes, however,  they enact general rules, as 
the Commission has  power to do  this in the same  fields • 
as are under its jurisdiction for the purposes of individual 
decisions. 
In implementation of the Rome Treaties, the Council and 
Commission issue regulations, directives, decisions, recom-
mendations and opinions. Regulations are of  general applica-
tion, they are binding in every respect and have direct force 
of law in every member state. Directives are binding on the 
member states to which they are addressed as regards the 
result to be achieved, but leave the mode and means to the 
discretion  of the  national  authorities.  Decisions  may  be 
addressed  either to  a  government  or to an enterprise  or 
private individual; they are binding in every respect on the 
party or parties named. Recommendations and opinions are 
not binding. 
This discrepancy in terminology between the Paris Treaty 
and the two Rome Treaties is possibly somewhat confusing. 
An ECSC "recommendation" is a binding enactment corres-
ponding to the EEC and Euratom "directive", whereas an 
EEC "recommendation" is  not binding and ranks in this 
regard as no stronger than an "opinion". 
The operation of the ECSC Treaty is centred principally 
on  the  Commission  (though  the  Council's  role  in  con-
nections of special importance must not be underrated). In 
EEC  and  Euratom,  the  teaming  of the  Commission  and 
Council  in  double  harness  provides  the  driving  force,  and 
perhaps the most original feature,  of the  whole  institutional 
set-up. The Commission's political authority, without which 
the  Commission  could  not properly  fulfil  its  function  in 
relation  to the  Council,  derives  from  the  fact  that it  is 
answerable to the Parliament alone. 
In the three Communities (ECSC,  EEC,  Euratom), the 
Court of Justice, as well as affording the member states and 
individuals the assurance of  full compliance with the Treaty 
and the enactments implementing it, plays a notable part in 
ensuring  uniform  interpretation  and  enforcement  of 
Community law. 
Financing the Community 
On the Commission's proposal and following the political 
guidelines  agreed  upon  at  The  Hague  Conference  .  of 
Heads  of States  and Governments  (December  1969),  the 
Council  of Ministers  gave  their  approval  in  1970  for  a 
system  to  be  set  up  granting  the  Community  certain 
financial resources of  its own. Owing to its unusual character, 
the six  Parliaments of the member states had to approve 
this decision,  in accordance with the EEC Treaty, before 
its entry into force on January 1, 1971.  1 
This new system is  being introduced gradually between 
1971 and the end of 1977. During a first period (1971 to the 
end of 1974), only a part of Community expenditure will 
be covered by revenue of its own. This revenue will consist 
of levies on imported agricultural products, which since the 
beginning of 1971  without exception have  formed part of 
the  Community's  own  resources,  and  of an, increasing 
proportion of customs  duties.  The  remaining  amount  of 
revenue  necessary  for  a  balanced  budget  is  still  met  by 
national contributions calculated on the basis of an overall 
scale  taking  account  of  each  country's  gross  national 
product (GNP). 
From  January  1,  1975,  the  budget  will  be  financed 
entirely  by  Community resources.  These  will  include  the 
total amount of  levies and customs duties, and also revenue 
corresponding to the product of  a fraction of  the value-added 
tax (VAT) up to the equivalent of  a one per cent rate of that 
tax.  The value-added tax will  at that time be governed by 
Community rules. 
A  certain framework  has  been provided to enable this 
system to be introduced gradually. During the first period 
(1971-74),  each member state's relative  share in financing 
the budget may only fluctuate  from  one year to the next 
between +  1 per cent and -1·5 per cent.  This framework 
will be extended for a three-year period once the financing 
is  entirely  ensured  by  Community  resources,  but at this 
point the fluctuation from  one year to the next  may  not 
exceed  2  per cent either way.  From January  1,  1978  the 
system will be applied in its entirety without any restrictions. 
The three new member countries are adopting the Com-
munity's financing system by stages. Over the period 1973-77 
inclusive they will gradually increase the proportion of the 
Community's annual budget which they provide, until in 1977 
it reaches 19·32 per cent for the United Kingdom, 0·61  per 
cent for Ireland and 2·46 per cent for Denmark. In the years 
1978 and 1979 the new countries' contribution will also be 
subject to limits, but in 1980 and after the full Community 
system will operate for these countries, as it will have done 
from 1978 onwards for the six original Community members. 
The Commission 
The European Treaties assign the Commission a wide range 
of duties  which may  be roughly grouped as follows.  The 
Commission is the guardian of the Treaties; it is the execu-
tive  arm  of the  Communities;  and it is  the  initiator  of 
Community policy and exponent of the Community interest 
to the Council. 
The Commission as the guardian of th 
Treaties 
The Commission sees to it that the provisions of  the Treaties, 
and the decisions  of the Institutions,  are  properly imple-
mented, and that a climate of mutual confidence prevails. 
If it does this watchdog work well, all concerned can carry 
out their obligations to the full  without a qualm, knowing 
that their opposite numbers are doing the same and that 
any  infringement  of the  Treaties  will .  be  duly  penalized. 
Conversely, no one can plead breach of obligation on the 
part of others as a reason for not doing his  own part: if 
anyone is in breach, it is for the Commission, as an impartial 
3 authority,  to  investigate,  issue  an  objective  ruling,  and 
notify the Government concerned, subject to verification by 
the Court, of the action required to put matters in order. 
The  ECSC Treaty too,  before  the  others,  required  the 
Institutions to discipline infringements,  but the procedure 
involving· governments was  a complex and cumbrous one 
which fortunately has seldom had to be invoked. Partly in 
the light of ECSC experience,  the provisions written into 
the Rome Treaties were simpler and stronger, and it is with 
these,  of which  a good deal of use  has been made in the 
EEC, that the following account is concerned. 
Where the Commission concludes that the Treaty has been 
infringed - which it may do  either on the  strength of an 
investigation by  its  own  officials,  or at the instance  of a 
Government, or following complaints from individuals - it 
requests  the state in question to submit its comments  or 
counter-arguments  within  a  specified  period  (usually  a 
month or a month and a half). If the member state allows 
the arrangement complained of to continue and its com-
ments do not cause the Commission to change its mind, the 
Commission issues a reasoned opinion with which the state 
must comply by the date set; if the state fails to do so, the 
Commission may refer the matter to the Court of Justice, 
whose  judgment  is  binding  on  both  the  state  and  the 
Institutions. 
These provisions, which give the Institutions a consider-
able  measure  of authority,  are  in  fact  enforced  in  all 
respects.  Thus, for example,  during 1972  the Commission 
instituted  proceedings  for  infringement  in  36  cases,  and 
decided to refer to the Court three cases. 
Most of the arrangements proceeded against in the first 
few  years  for  infringement  of the  EEC Treaty related  to 
customs duties and quotas. Nowadays there are cases under 
a great many other Treaty provisions - notably the applica-
tion  of  the  agricultural  regulations - and  the  diversity 
increases as more common policies come into effect.  There 
is  little  prospect,  therefore,  of  any  diminution  in  the 
Commission's "policing" activities. 
The  economic  impact  of the  actionable  arrangements 
themselves was inconsiderable: for the most part they were 
not deliberate attempts to evade the Treaty, but the result 
either  of differences  in  interpretation  between  the  Com-
mission and one of the member states, which were  settled 
by the Court, or of the kind of mistake that is pretty well 
bound to crop up here and there when national civil services 
have to adjust to Community procedures. It  can reasonably 
be considered that the infringements committed up to now 
have  not  interfered  to  any  real  extent  with  the  proper 
implementation of the Treaties. 
The Commission as the executive arm of the 
Communiti  s 
The Commission is  directly  invested by  the Treaties with 
.  wide  executive powers; in addition, it now possesses  sub-
stantial extra powers conferred on it by the Council, mostly 
in connection with EEC matters, for securing the implemen-
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tation of enactments based on  the Treaty (this  is  termed 
"derived Community law"). 
Both  sets  of powers,  those  stemming  direct  from  the 
Treaties and those made over by the Council, can be sub-
divided under two or three main· heads. 
1.  Preparation of the implementing ord  rs with 
respect to  certain  Treaty  provisions  or  Council 
enactments. 
The  ECSC  Treaty  gives  the  Cop1mission  particularly 
extensive rule-making powers: its function is declared to be 
"to assure the aehievement of the purposes stated in this 
Treaty  within  the  terms  thereof",  and  practically  every 
article invests it with a fresh responsibility and correspond-
ing powers. 
The  Rome  Treaties  also  give  the  Commission  direct 
rule-making  authority,  especially  the  EEC  Treaty  with 
regard to all matters connected with the establishment of 
the customs union in accordance with the Treaty timetable. 
Nevertheless,  it  is  mainly  the  powers  conferred  by  the 
Council  in  connection  with  the  common  policies  - and 
more especially common agricultural policy - that have so 
notably enlarged  the Commission's responsibilities  in the 
last few  years.  Figures  speak  louder  than words:  during 
1972  alone,  the  Commission  enacted  2,590  regulations, 
mostly relating to the common agricultural policy. 
2.  Application of the Treaties' rules to particular 
cases (whether concerning a government or a firm) 
and the administration of Community funds.  · 
Here again the Commission plays a particularly prominent 
role in the ECSC: it deals direct with the coal and steel enter-
prises, closely superintends certain aspects of  their activities, 
and can promote and co-ordinate  their capital  spending, 
assist  miners  and  steelworkers  facing  redundancy,  grant 
loans and so on. 
Under  the  EEC  Treaty,  it  has  many  similar  powers, 
especially  with  regard  to  competition  (keeping  cartelliza-
tion and market dominance within bounds, similarly setting 
limits  to,  or  doing  away  with,  state  subsidization,  dis-
couraging discriminatory fiscal  practices, etc.); in addition, 
it has been given various powers by the Council with respect 
to the common policies, notably on agriculture and transport. 
Under the  Euratom Treaty  it has  supervisory  respon-
sibilities comparable with those it bears in the coal and steel 
sector,  concerning  such  matters  as  supplies  of  fissile 
materials, protection against radiation, inspection of  nuclear 
plant, and dissemination of technical information. 
Again, the Commission is the Institution responsible for 
the administration of Community funds. The lead was given 
by the ECSC. A levy paid in direct to the Commission on coal 
and steel production assures it of  sizeable financial resources 
part of which is expended on the tiding-over, retraining and 
redeployment of redundant workers, and another part held 
in reserve  as  backing for the borrowings from  which  the 
Commission relends  towards  the  modernization  of mines 
and steel plants and the redevelopment of areas affected by 
• declining coal or steel  production.  Between  1952 and the 
end  of 1972,  the  High  Authority  and  its· successor,  the 
Commission, in this way  borrowed and relent in all  some 
1,300 million units of account*. 
On the Euratom side,  the Commission is in charge of a 
Community  research  and  training  programme.  The  first 
five-year  programme  (1958-62)  represented  an  outlay  of 
215 million units of account, the second (1963-67) an outlay 
of 430 million units of account. The many projects carried 
out  include  the  construction  of  four  nuclear  research 
stations: at Ispra in Italy, Karlsruhe in Germany,  Mol in 
Belgium and Petten in the Netherlands. 
The  major changes  which  have  taken place  in  nuclear 
research in the past few years have necessitated the reorgani-
zation of  Euratom's joint research centre and the redefinition 
of its aims. 
These are substantial sums, but they are by no means all. 
First  of all,  the  European  Social  Fund,. which  helps  to 
retrain  and  redeploy  workers,  has  been  given  a  more 
decisive  role  in  the  development  of social  structures.  Its 
budget for the calendar year  1973  is  240 million units  of 
account  and this  should  regularly  increase  in the future. 
Then there is  the European Development Fund for the 
overseas  countries  and  territories  associated  with  the 
Community:  the  first  Development  Fund  (1958-63) 
disbursed  580  million  units  of account,  while  the  second 
(1964-69)  had  an appropriation  of 730  million  units,  of 
which  680  million units  was  set  aside  for  grants  and .  50 
million  units  for  exceptionally  advantageous  loans.  The 
third EDF (1971-75) provides a total of 900 million units, 
including 810 million units in grants and 90 million units 
in loans. 
The Commission also operates a food•aid programme for 
developing countries (about 50 million units will be spent 
in 1973). 
The  European  Agricultural  Guidance  and  Guarantee 
Fund  disposes  of much  larger  amounts  still.  Under  the 
1973 budget, for instance, it received 3,140 million units, to 
enable it to cover the agricultural market support costs and 
to  furnish  assistance  of 325  million  units  towards  farm 
modernization schemes. 
3.  Administration of the safeguard clauses in the 
Tr  aties. 
These, the so-called "escape clauses", provide that authoriza-
tion may be given  to waive  the Treaties'  requirements in 
exceptional circumstances. This places a very heavy respon-
sibility on the Commission. Had it been left to the individual 
states  themselves  to  decide  whether  special  problems  or 
circumstances entitled them to  by-pa~s the rules laid down 
in  the Treaty or the implementing orders,  sooner or later 
interpretations would have  differed,  and before long each 
would  have been doing as  it pleased.  The Treaties wisely 
provide that the Commission and the Commission only, in 
•one Community unit of account officially represents the value of 0.88867088 grams of 
fine  gold and on April 2, 1973  corresponded approximately to SUS 1.21  and, with the 
floating of sterling and the Irish pound, to £0.49.  For agricultural trade the unit of 
account was fixed early in 1973 at approximately £0.46. 
the  strictest independence  and objectivity,  may  authorize 
waivers ("derogations") at the request of a member state, 
having considered all the circumstances and seeking in each 
case to ensure that the operation of the Common Market is 
interfered with as little as possible. The Council has given it 
similar powers in  the enactments relating to the common 
policies. 
Waivers may be of  many kinds, ranging from the fixing of 
tariff  quotas  to  the  exemption  of whole  sectors  of the 
economy from the Treaty's requirements. Most of the cases 
in which the escape clauses have been invoked have con-
cerned the ECSC and the EEC. However, High Authority 
and Commission action has enabled the waivers to be kept 
strictly limited in scope, so that they have only marginally 
impaired the operation of the Common Market. 
The main safeguard clauses  which  were  inserted in  the 
Treaties themselves had a general scope, but were valid only 
during the transitional period, i.e. until December 31, 1969. 
The  only  exception  is  Article  115  of the  EEC  Treaty, 
which  authorizes member states to take measures  against 
deflection  of trade.  However,  the  other safeguard clauses 
have been reintroduced for the duration of the transition 
period  (January  1,  1973  - December  31,  1977)  if such 
problems arise in respect of the three new member states. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Community  rules  which  have 
developed in many sectors have, in certain cases  and in a 
more restrictive manner, provided for exceptional measures. 
These are generally more concerned with relations between 
the  Community  and  non-member  countries  than  with 
relations  between  the  member  states  themselves.  The 
Commission has been entrusted with the responsibility for 
these  measures,  and in  most  cases  the  Council  may  be 
asked  to  modify  or confirm  the  measures  taken  by  the 
Commission.  Recourse  to these exceptional measures  has 
become  less  and  less  frequent  and  the  Commission  has 
always insisted on granting waivers only to the extent that 
they are necessary and implemented in such a way that they 
do not substantially affect the functioning of the Common 
~1arket.  · 
The Management Committees 
We  have seen how much Council decisions have  done,  as 
regards the EEC, to extend the field  of the Commission's 
management and administration work by giving the latter 
additional  responsibilities  in  the  enforcement  of derived 
Community law.  In many cases,  the Council was  anxious 
that the powers so  conferred should be exercised in close 
consultation with the member governments, and accordingly 
various  committees  of  government  representatives  are 
attached to the Commission. Some are purely consultative 
in character,  but the most original,  and in the event the 
most valuable, part of the system is the array of "Manage-
ment Committees" concerned with agricultural marketing, 
one committee for each main category of products. 
The  procedure  is  that  the  implementing  measure  the 
Commission intends to enact is  submitted in draft form to 
5 the appropriate Management Committee, which then gives 
its opinion, arrived at by voting weighted in the same way 
as in the Council. 
The  committee's  opinion  is  not binding  on the  Com-
mission, which notes the contents but remains entirely free 
to decide for itself; the measure once enacted by it there-
upon has direct force of law.  However, if the opinion has 
been given by qualified majority (4l·votes out of 58) and the 
Commission nevertheless takes a different stand, the matter 
goes  before  the  Council,  which  may  within  one  month 
reverse the Commission's decision. If on the other hand the 
Commission's  decision  is  in  line  with  the  committee's 
opinion, or if no opinion has been forthcoming (the com-
mittee having failed to muster a qualified majority one way 
or the other), that decision is final and no appeal can lie to 
the Council. 
The  Management  Committee  procedure  is  extensively 
employed,  and works  extremely  well.  In 1972,  some  323 
meetings of  the various Management Committees were held, 
following  which about 1,030  Commission regulations and 
decisions were adopted. Favourable opinions were given in 
more than 980 cases. No adverse opinions were given, and 
in 47 cases no opinion was offered by the committee. 
This is  eloquent of the atmosphere of co-operation and 
mutual confidence which has developed in the committees 
between  the  Commission's  departments  and the  national 
departments which subsequently enforce the Commission's 
enactments. 
The function of the Management Committees is to act as 
a kind of alarm mechanism. When the Commission differs 
from  an opinion given  by  a  qualified  majority - that is, 
voted for by most of the Government representatives - this 
is a clear indication of  a difficult situation or a serious prob-
lem,  which· it is  only  right  and proper that the  Council 
should deliberate itself. That it is seldom called upon to do 
so is proof that the system works and the parties to it are 
substantially in agreement. 
The  Management  Committees  having  been  such  a 
success,  similar arrangements have been introduced in the 
last few  years in other fields  also. Thus, three committees 
of government  representatives  have  been  set  up  to  help 
manage  different  aspects  of the  implementation  of the 
common customs tariff following the establishment of the 
customs union on July 1,  1968. Others have been set up, in 
particular  to  control  technical  and  health  standards, 
especially  in the  food  and animal-health fields.  Basically, 
the system is the same as for the agricultural Management 
Committees,  though  the  conditions  under  which  the 
Council may be called upon to act will be different, according 
to the particular features of each case. 
A  formula  which  has  already  been  applied  in  several 
cases  provides that when  the provisions envisaged by the 
Commission conflict with the committee's opinion, or when 
there is no opinion, the Commission may make a proposal 
to the Council on the measures to be taken. The Council 
decides by a qualified majority vote. If  the Council reaches 
no decision within a certain time (normally three months) 
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after the matter has  been  referred  to it,  the  Commission 
takes the decision itself. 
The Commission and the coherence of 
Community policy 
The Commission is the initiator of Community policy and 
exponent of the Community interest, and is responsible for 
seeing  that  Community  policy  forms  a  single  consistent 
whole. 
In the  more  limited fields  of ECSC  and Euratom,  the 
High Authority and the Euratom Commission  had more 
to do in the way of administration and supervision and less 
in the way of framing common policies, it being peculiarly 
difficult  to  hammer  out  such  policies  for  Communities 
having jurisdiction only over specific sectors. The merger of 
the  executives  in  1967  permitted  the  redistribution  of 
responsibilities  between  the  members  of the  single  Com-
mission and the drawing up of  a number of  common policies: 
industrial policy, energy policy, research and technological 
policy - which despite valuable achievements in the early 
stages had been hanging fire  in consequence of the fact of 
there being three separate Executives up to that time. 
The EEC Commission had since its establishment regarded 
as  one  of its  most  important functions  the  initiation  of 
common policies, a role which has now been taken over by 
the  single  Commission.  Quite  apart from  the  dictates  of 
economics,  because  the  Common  Market Treaty is  what 
may be termed an "outline treaty", unlike its ECSC and 
Euratom counterparts, which are "code-of-rules treaties". 
For,  whereas  the  latter  two  lay  down  in  careful  detail 
exactly what rules  are to be applied and what tasks per-
formed  in their respective  spheres,  the  Common  Market 
Treaty,  apart  from  its  "automatic"  provisions  on  the 
dismantling of  tariffs and quotas, confines itself to sketching 
out in general terms the policy lines to be pursued in the 
main  areas  of economic  activity,  leaving  it to the  Com-
munity Institutions, and more especially the Council and 
Commission in conjunction with the Parliament,  to work 
out the actual arrangements the Community is to establish. 
In a sense, everything to do with the economic union has 
been left blank in the Treaty, but the blanks can be filled in 
by the Institutions without need for fresh treaties or fresh 
parliamentary ratification. The measures the Institutions are 
empowered  to  bring  in  are  full-scale  "European  laws", 
directly enforceable in all the member states and capable of 
producing radical changes in the sectors concerned. To give 
an example, the great corpus of "European laws" on agri-
culture, promulgated from 1962 onwards, is comparable in 
scope to the corpus of rules contained in the ECSC Treaty. 
Moreover,  the  guidelines  laid  down  by  the  Heads  of 
State and Government of the  Nine  at the  Summit Con-
ference  in Paris in October  1972  require  the Community 
institutions  to  draw  up  common  policies  in  fields  not  • 
strictly provided for in the Treaties themselves, with the aim 
of developing  the  Communities  into  an  economic  and 
monetary union by 1980. It is  worth pausing a moment to consider the view  fre-
quently  voiced  that the  Common  Market  Treaty  is  less 
supranational, or more intergovernmental, than the ECSC 
Treaty. This is to a great extent a mistaken approach. The 
"code-of-rules" Coal and Steel Treaty laid down the High 
Authority's  powers  of implementation  in  detail,  but not 
until the requisite common policies have been agreed can it 
be known what powers of implementation the Commission 
holds in each particular sector covered by the EEC Treaty. 
Experience with regard to cartels and agriculture has shown 
us that these powers are similar to those stemming from the 
ECSC Treaty. It should be added, however, that the Paris 
Treaty did, right from the start, assure the High Authority, 
and now assures the Commission, of  an independent income 
from the ECSC levy, with the aid of  which the Executive has 
been able to do a good deal on the financial and social side, 
whereas  the  corresponding  provision  in the  EEC Treaty 
entered into effect on January 1,  1971  (under the system of 
independent revenue described on page 3). 
Actually, the Paris and Rome Treaties are based on the 
same principles and purport to set up parallel institutional 
systems. But the EEC Treaty, evolving as it goes along and 
allowing its makers to work out empirically when the time 
comes the arrangement best suited to a particular sector or 
situation, has jarred the less on those not fully converted to 
the Community idea, while the balance which it represents 
between the powers of the national Governments and the 
powers of  the European Institutions is more clearly apparent 
to those who are just beginning to know and to learn to live 
with  the  Communities.  For all  the  difficulties  the  EEC 
has encountered in the past, this is nonetheless a fact. 
The Commission--
Council dialogue 
The merged Institutions have continued the work of  building 
up the fabric of  European economic union: the Treaties laid 
the foundations, but the structure had still to be erected. In 
addition, once the fabric is in place for a particular sector, 
they have to formulate arid implement day by day the Com-
munity policy that is to take the place of the nine national 
policies. 
Under  the  ECSC  Treaty,  the  dialogue  between  Com-
mission and Council existed,  but on a limited scale  only. 
The Commission (or the High Authority, as it then was) 
bore a great deal of the responsibility for the implementa-
tion of the Treaty, but the Council's endorsement-in some 
cases its unanimous endorsement - was required neverthe-
less  for  certain  particularly  important  decisions,  as  for 
instance in the event of  "manifest crisis" or if  it was desired 
to amend the Treaty. The form is of course not the same as 
in  the Rome Treaties.  In the ECSC,  the High Authority 
(now the Commission) decides with the Council's endorse-
ment; in the EEC and Euratom, the Council decides on the 
basis of the Commission's proposal. The difference is  not 
without its implications from the policymaking standpoint, 
but in both cases the two Institutions have their part to play 
before a decision can be finally adopted. 
Under  the  Rome  Treaties,  any  measure  of  general 
application or of a certain level  of importance has  to be 
enacted by the Council of  Ministers, but except in a very few 
cases the Council can only proceed upon proposal by the 
Commission. The Commission has thus a permanent duty 
to initiate action. If it submits no proposals, the Council is 
paralysed and the forward march of the Community comes 
to a halt - in agriculture, in transport, in commercial policy, 
in harmonization of laws, or whatever the field  concerned 
maybe. 
As an indication of the volume of the Commission's and 
Council's  work  under  the  three  Treaties,  it  may  be 
mentioned  that in  1972  the  Commission  laid  before  the 
Council  467  proposals  and  234  memoranda  and  other 
documents of various kinds. 
During  1972  the  Council,  in  addition  to dealing  with 
purely procedural matters and with budgets and financial 
regulations, adopted 264 regulations, 28  directives, and 44 
decisions. 
The  Rome  Treaty  procedure  is  by  far  the  commoner 
occurrence in the dealings between the Commission and the 
Council. A few  further particulars as to its operation may 
therefore be in order. 
A proposal having been lodged, a dialogue begins between 
the Ministers of  the Council, putting their national points of 
view, and the Commission, in its capacity as the European 
body upholding the interest of the Community as a whole 
and seeking European solutions to common problems. 
There might seem to be some risk of the dialogue being 
distorted  by  the Commission's  being less  strongly  placed 
than the  governments  with  the  weight  of their sovereign 
authority behind them.  However, the Rome Treaties con-
trive rather ingeniously to ensure that the two  are evenly 
matched. 
In the Commission's favour there is, for a start, the fact 
that it draws up the proposal the Council is to deliberate -
and only  on the  basis  of that proposal can ·the  Council 
deliberate at all. But its position is buttressed in other ways 
too. 
Article  149  EEC (119  Euratom),  one  of the  key  com-
ponents in the institutional structure, provides that "when, 
pursuant to this Treaty, the Council acts on a proposal of 
the  Commission,  it shall,  where  the  amendment  of such 
proposal is  involved,  act only  by  means  of a  unanimous 
vote". 
If  the Ministers are unanimous, they can therefore decide 
on their own authority, even should their decision be counter 
to the Commission's proposal. This is fair enough, since the 
Council is then expressing the united view of all the govern-
ments together. 
On the other hand, they can decide by a majority only if 
7 their decision is in line with the Commission's proposal. In 
other words,  if the  member  states· are  not at one,  they 
cannot take a majority decision unlessit entails accepting 
the proposal in  toto,  without amendment:  only the Com-
mission  itself  can  amend  it.  Thus,  in  cases  where  the 
majority rule applies, the position is that either the Council 
adopts the Commission's proposal as it stands, by a majority, 
or it decides against the proposal, unanimously, or it fails 
to come to a  decision at all.  So  the  Commission does in 
fact have genuine bargaining power in the Council. Dialogue 
can  be conducted,  and is  indeed conducted on the Com-
mission's own ground. 
Now this  dialogue  has  a  momentum  of its  own.  The 
application· of the majority rule,  as fairly substantial EEC 
experience has shown, does not mean that a state is liable 
to find itself outvoted at the drop of a hat. The Commission 
in drawing up its proposal will have been careful to take into 
account the often widely-varying. interests of the individual 
states and seek to establish where the general interest lies. 
As is usual in a club of so few members, both the members 
of the Council and the Commission like to be in agreement 
if they can. Hence, if faced with the prospect. of being out-
voted, a minister may feel it best to abandon an extreme or 
isolated position, while for the sake of good relations the 
Commission, and those of the Council who are in favour of 
its proposal, may make the necessary efforts to help secure 
a rapprochement. The result-a trifle paradoxical, but amply 
confirmed in practice - is that the majority rule makes for 
much easier and quicker arrival at unanimity. In this delicate 
interplay of forces, the Commission is always in a position 
to sway the outcome. 
The Commission is thus centrally placed in the Council, 
able regularly to act as "honest broker" among-the Govern-
ments, and to apply the prompting and pressure required to 
evolve formulas acceptable all round. 
The implications for policymaking are more important 
still. The Commission's proposals embody a policy prepared 
by it on the basis purely of the interest of the Community 
as a whole. The fact that the Commission is there to stay 
throughout its term of office ensures the continuity of that 
policy, and the Council can pronounce only on the Com-
mission's proposed enactments for putting the policy into 
effect. There is therefore no danger that the Council might 
adopt  conflicting  proposals  on different  issues  in conse-
quence  of shifting  majorities  arising  out  of alliances  of 
interests or contests of influence among Governments. 
Nor can it happen that a  majority of the Council, un-
backed by the Commission, can impose on a  recalcitrant 
state a measure gravely deleterious to that state's essential 
interests. If the Commission does its job properly, it can be 
no  party to  such  a  proceeding.  Its  role  thus  affords  an 
important safeguard, more especially to the smaller member 
states, and they in particular have always set great store by this. 
Unanimity and majority voting 
Under  the  Paris  Treaty,  as  we  have  seen,  the  Council's 
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endorsement is required only in a limited number of cases; 
in some it has to be unanimous, but in most it can be given  • 
by a majority vote. This system has been duly adhered to 
since  the Treaty came into  force.  When the  Council,  in 
May 1959, refused its consent to the High Authority's plan 
to  declare  a  state of· "manifest crisis"  in the coal sector 
(ECSCwas then going through one of  its periods of  greatest 
difficulty), the case was, it should be noted, one calling for a 
majority and not a unanimous endorsement: the Council's 
refusal was due therefore not to a solitary veto but to the 
fact that there was nota majority in favour. 
In the EEC, during the first two stages of the transitional 
period, from 1958 to the end of 1965, most Council decisions 
had to be unanimous, so that the procedure described above 
was  not often needed.  Nevertheless,  thanks to the Com-
munity spirit of the members of the Council,  and to the 
collective  authority  of  the  Commission  and  the  high 
personal  repute  of its  members,  the  dialogue  invariably 
went off smoothly and the Commission was able to play its 
part of instigator and conciliator to the full. 
The scheduled move into the third stage, on January 1, 
1966,  was to have brought a major extension in the scope 
for majority decisions, but at this point the majority principle 
became the focus of a Community crisis. Was it tolerable, 
one of the  governments  demanded,  that a  member state 
should be overruled by the rest where one of its essential 
interests was at stake? 
This is  not· a  question that can be answered merely by 
citing the· relevant provisions, nor indeed is  it possible to 
define objectively what constitutes an "essential interest". 
Besides,  if· for the sake of argument the matter is viewed 
purely in terms of interests, it could well be that in fields 
where all the member states had forgone their freedom of 
action for the benefit ofthe Community, the vetoing of a 
Community  decision  for the  sake  of ·a  national interest 
would  prejudice. the  essential  interests  of other  member 
states,  which  would  be  harmed  by  the  paralysis  of the 
Community. On the other hand, a state accepting the Com-
munity system and relying on its inner logic, its Institutions 
and their rules and traditions can be assured that these will 
furnish all reasonable safeguards. 
The general interest of the Community must of necessity 
take account of any essential interest of one of its members. 
It is  the Institutions' bounden duty, therefore, to consider 
such  an interest to the full.  The close  union  of the  nine 
nations which the Comtnunity exists to bring about would 
in any case not be feasible if one of those nations suffered 
grave injury to its essential interests. Moreover, the system 
of deliberation in the Council just described is calculated to 
achieve the broadest possible. measure of agreement.  Con-
versely, even where unanimity is the rule, no member of a 
Community can disregard the general interest in assessing 
his .  own:  unanimity in a  Community cannot be equated 
with .an absolute right of veto. 
Thus, in a living Community, abuse of majority voting -
and probably abuse of unanimity too - is a theoretical risk • 
which,  with  the  Community's  inner  bonds  drawing  ever 
closer as it moves forward, is becoming less and less likely 
to  materialize,  while  the possibility  of majority  decisions 
renders the whole system more flexible and more dynamic. 
To have faith in the future, faith in the Institutions' and 
governments' good sense and desire to work amicably to-
gether, is the only possible answer. After all, the six Foreign 
Ministers in session in Luxembourg on January 28,  1966, 
after months of crisis and difficult debate, had in the end to 
acknowledge that failure to agree on the application of the 
majodty rule  was  no  reason for  not continuing with  the 
joint venture. 
After the crisis of 1965-66,  decisions  by  majority voting 
were for a long time limited to administrative and budgetary 
matters. More recently the position has gradually eased, and 
it is  now not rare for matters of some importance to be 
decided  by  majority  decision  or,  even  more,  "quasi.;. 
majority" decision  (in  which  a  member state in disagree-
ment  with  the  others  is  content ·to· abstain from  voting). 
The European 
Parliament 
For the dialogue between Commission and Council to be a 
genuine one, it is necessary that the Commission should be 
genuinely independent.  To this  end,  the Treaties make it 
answerable to the-European Parliament alone. 
The  Parliament is  so constituted as  to bejn fact  truly 
Community  in  character,  fully  integrated.  There  are  no 
national  sections;_ there  are- only  European-level  political 
groups. The Parliament keeps constant watch on the Com-
mission's doings,  making sure that it faithfully represents 
the Community interest, ready a_t any time to call it to order 
if it gives the impression of yielding to blandishments from 
the  governments  or  from  a  particular  government..  In 
addition, the Parliament has to be .  expressly. consulted on 
the  Commission's  more  important  proposals under  the 
Rome Treaties before these go to the Council. 
The Parliament's various committees play a notable part 
in  this  connection.  The  House  itself normally  meets  in 
ordinary session seven or eight times a year, fot' a week at a 
time (plus, on occasion, a number of  extraordinary sessions 
of two days).  Between sessions,  each of the parliamentary 
committees meets at least once, and frequently several times, 
and the  appropriate. member  of the  Comwission appears 
before it to give an account of the decisions taken by the 
Commission, the decisions referred to the Council, and the 
position adopted by the Commission vis-a-vis the Council. 
The committees thus follow· developments in detail, and 
as they meet in 'camera they can be told a great deal, includ-
ing even confidential matter. Their work has done much to 
increase  the  Parliament's  influence  in  the  day-to-day 
handling of affairs. 
The written questions which Members of Parliament can 
put  to  the  Commission  (and  also  to  the  Council)  offer 
another means of  control which is being increasingly resorted 
to.  During  the  parliamentary  year  1972-73,  664  written 
questions  were  put  to  the  Commission  and  63  to  the 
Council,  while  one  question  was  put  jointly  to  both 
institutions. 
By means of oral questions put in plenary session of the 
House (which may or may not be followed  by a  debate), 
the Parliament is enabled, to keep a careful eye on develop-
ments in European policy, both generally and with respect 
to particular sectors, and to comment directly at the time, 
sidestepping the sometimes  rather unwieldy  procedure of 
statements by the Commission, sending to committee, and 
reports to the full  House.  The Parliament has in the last 
few  years· been  making more  and  more  use  of this  very 
flexible and effective device, putting oral questions both to 
the Commission and to the Council. 
In the parliamentary year 1971-72  eight oral questions, 
with or without debate, were put to the Council of  Ministers 
and 13 to the Commission. In the 1972-73 session, prior to a 
change in procedure, nine oral questions were  put to the 
Council and 24 to the Commission. 
The  introduction,  since  the  beginning  of 1973,  of an 
hour's  Question  Time  during  each  part-session  of the 
Parliament has given a new and promising impetus to this 
procedure.  After the reply by the Commission (or by the 
Council, which has announced its willingness to accept this 
procedure) the  Members of the Parliament can put short 
supplementary  questions,  and  in  this  way  carry  on  an 
animated dialogue with the Executive. 
During thenew-style Question Time in the February and 
March 1973. sittings the Commission replied respectively to 
seven and eleven questions. 
.  With the  Community's responsibilities  growing as  they 
are_ doing,  it is· becoming  absolutely  essential  that  steps 
should be taken in the near future to give  the Parliament 
wider  powers  and  to· make  it  more  representative,  for 
example  by  causing  it  to  be  elected  by  direct  universal 
suffrage. This is bound to come, despite the hesitations that 
have prevented it up to now. 
The control exercised by  the Parliament thus- underpins 
the. independence of the Commission, thanks to which the 
Council  has  the  advantages  of  the  majority  principle 
and is  shielded  as  far  as  may  be  from  such  risks  as  it 
entails. 
Increased powers 
At· the  same  time  as  the  Council  decided  to  grant  the 
·Community a system of financial resources of its own, the 
member states signed a Protocol on April 22, 1970, to alter 
the Community Treaties in order to increase the Parliament's 
budgetary powers.  This increase  of powers applies  to ·the 
"free~' part of the budget,  i.e.,  basically,  the  part which 
9 deals with the functioning of the Community's institutions. 
In  1971  the  Parliament  received  considerably  increased 
powers  over  this  "free"  part,  although  the  Council  may 
still  amend its  proposals.  On the  other hand, from  1975 
onwards  the  Parliament will  have  the last word  and will 
take the final decisions on this part of the budget. 
The sums in question may  seem limited in comparison 
with the total amount of  the budget (they are often reckoned 
to amount to about 5 per cent), but the power to control 
them  assumes  great  political  importance,  because  they 
determine the means whereby the Community's institutions 
may  work and carry out inquiries and studies, i.e.  every-
thing which guarantees their independent functioning.  Not 
only will the Parliament be able to alter the contents of the 
budget,  it will  also  be  able  to  increase  it  within  certain 
limits. 
The appropriations in the other part of the budget, which 
might be  called  the "intervention" part, mostly  represent 
the  virtually  automatic consequence  of Community  rules 
(e.g.  rules  about  agricultural  markets).  The  Parliament 
has not been given the last word in this field.  It may only 
propose amendments to the Council, which has undertaken 
to give its reasons to the Parliament if it does not accept 
such amendments. 
The  agreement  giving  these  increased  powers  to  the 
Parliament came into force on January 1,  1971, after being 
ratified by the six Parliaments. The application of the new 
procedure for  the  1972  and  1973  budgetary years  was  a 
success, although its importance is still limited. In 1973 the 
Commission put forward new proposals for Treaty amend-
ments  to  increase  the  Parliament's  budgetary  powers 
further. 
The increase in the Communities' activities, the decision to 
give  the  Community  an  independent  budget,  and  the 
increased  powers  of the  European  Parliament  provided 
further  arguments  for  the  election  of the  Parliament  by 
direct universal suffrage.  The Summit Conference in Paris 
in  October  1972  discussed  this  at  length,  but  without 
reaching agreement. The debate will doubtless be resumed 
in connection with  the target of a  "European union" by 
1980  set  at the  Summit,  quite  apart from  other possible 
initiatives.  Moreover,  several  national  parliaments  are 
considering bills providing for their own countries' delegates 
to the European Parliament to be directly elected, without 
waiting for the election by this means of the Parliament as 
a whole. 
The steady extension of the Communities' responsibilities 
makes the expansion of the Parliament's role and powers 
more and more necessary. The Paris Summit moved clearly 
in this direction, especially on the Parliament's powers of 
control. In addition, the institutions and the governments 
must consider, from -1973  onwards, the division of powers 
between the member states and the institutions. This must 
be settled in order to ensure the effective  working of the 
10 
economic and monetary union of the Nine, which will make 
it necessary to reconsider the Parliament's powers. 
The Court of Justice 
By  reason of the substantial powers of direct enforcement 
vested  in  the  High  Authority  for  the  operation  of the 
common  market for  coal  and steel,  the  ECSC  Court of 
Justice was  mainly called upon to handle appeals to it by 
coal  and  steel  enterprises.  In  1958,  the  Rome  Treaties 
instftuted in its stead a single Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Communities:  since  they,  and particularly the EEC 
Treaty,  required  for  their implementation  a  considerable 
measure of  government action, the first cases coming before 
the  new  Court were  brought by the Commission  against 
the  governments for infringements  of the Treaties.  Later 
there came also appeals by governments against decisions 
of the Commission, and appeals by individuals. 
The Court's procedure for dealing with cases of this kind 
is broadly similar to that of the highest courts of appeal of 
the member states. Its judgments not only settle the particu-
lar  matters  at issue,  but also  lay  down  the  precise  con-
struction to be placed on disputed passages in the Treaties, 
thereby  affording  clarification  and  guidance  as  to  their 
implementation. 
In recent years, over and above this function of making 
sure that Community enactments are good law, the Court 
has  increasingly  been  called  upon to sit on interlocutory 
appeals from  national courts.  Community law  proper as 
contained in the Treaties,  and  the  corpus  of enactments 
based  on  the  Treaties  (derived  Community  law),  are 
becoming more and more  interwoven with the  municipal 
law  of the individual member countries, and consequently 
their implementation is  occupying a  growing  part of the 
national courts' attention. By the end of 1972, the national 
courts had handed down over 400  decisions having to do 
with Community law under the EEC and ECSC Treaties. 
(So·  far  there  have  been  none  concerning  the  Euratom 
Treaty, owing to its rather special character). 
Interlocutory referrals to the Court of  Justice are requests 
to  it to  rule  as  to  the  interpretation  or applicability  of 
particular portions of Community law (in the ECSC,  the 
applicability of Commission and Council enactments only). 
Their steadily-growing  numbers  bear witness to the closer 
interaction in matters of litigation between  the European 
Court and the national courts, which is enabling Community 
law to be uniformly enforced in all the member countries 
and a consistent body of European case law built up. 
A  few  figures  may  serve  to  indicate  the  extent  of the 
Court of Justice's  work.  Between  1952,  when  the  ECSC 
Treaty  came  into force,  and the  end  of 1972,  604  cases 
were  brought,  not  counting  administrative  actions  by 
Community  officials  in  connection  with  staff  rules  and 
regulations.  Of this total, 319  related to the EEC Treaty: of these  181  were  preliminary rulings,  89  were actions by 
individuals, and the remainder actions by the Commission 
or by governments. Of  the 280 ECSC cases brought between 
1952 and  1972,  257  were  instituted  by  individuals  and 
enterprises, 22 by governments, and one by the former High 
Authority. Three actions had been brought with respect to 
Euratom. 
Working methods 
From this brief  account of  the main duties of  the Institutions, 
their relation  to  one  another and the  balance  of powers 
among them, we now turn to their methods. 
How does the Commission work? 
D  partm  nts of the Commission 
The  merged  Commission's  departments  consist  of ·  the 
combined  departments  of the  High  Authority  of ECSC 
and of the EEC and Euratom Commissions.  There are a 
General  Secretariat,  a  Legal  Department,  a  Statistical 
Office,  19  Directorates-.General,  and  a  small  number  of 
specialized services. 
The staff will total, at the end of 1973 after the inclusion of 
officials from the new member states, 6,700, of whom 1,900 
will  be of administrative and executive grades.  More than 
one quarter of these will  be British, Irish or Danish. The 
translation and interpretation staff numbers more than 700. 
These employees are divided between the two provisional 
seats  of  the  Institutions  in  Brussels  and  Luxembourg 
(where 1,150 civil servants are based). 
Over and above the  6, 700 civil  servants is  the research 
staff,  due  to total  1,650  under the  present five-year  pro-
gramme; most of them work in the Joint Research Centre's 
establishments. 
The staff of the other institutions will be approximately: 
Parliament  1,000;  Council  1,200;  Court 200. Over 500 of 
the total will be interpreters and translators. 
The operating expenses  of the four Institutions in 1973 
amount  to  over  270  million  units  of account,  or about 
6·5 per cent of the total Community budget. 
Each of the  13  Members  of the  Commission  has been 
made  specially  responsible for  one  or more of the Com-
munity's  main  fields  of activity  (external  relations,  agri-
culture, social affairs  and so  on),  and has  under him the 
Directorate or Directorates-General dealing with these. 
Operation of the Commission 
By the terms of the Treaties, the Commission's operation is 
"collegiate": that is, the Commission must itself, as a body, 
adopt the various  measures  - viz.  regulations,  decisions, 
proposals to the Council, etc. - incumbent on it under the 
Treaties  or implementing  orders,  and  cannot,  therefore, 
delegate to a member in his particular sphere powers giving 
him a degree of independence comparable to that of,  say, 
a minister in his department. Only very limited delegations 
of powers are granted, for the issuing of strictly  technical 
implementing  measures  in  line  with  the  Commission's 
agreed approach, such as  the day-to-day fixing  of certain 
agricultural levies. 
Various procedural devices have been adopted to ensure 
that the  system  does  not allow  log-jams  to  build  up  in 
Commission business. Discussion on particularly important 
or complex subjects is prepared by ad hoc committees of  the 
Commissioners most closely concerned in each case. 
The more technical items  on the Commission's agenda 
are  considered  at  a  weekly  meeting  of  the  members' 
immediate subordinates, the Chief Executive Assistants, in 
order  to  simplify  and  speed  up  the  proceedings.  Fairly 
straightforward matters are to a great extent dealt with by 
means of "written procedure" earlier employed by the EEC 
Commission: the members are sent the particulars and the 
text of a  proposed decision,  and if within a given  period 
(usually  one  week)  they  have  not entered reservations  or 
objections the proposal is taken as adopted. 
In  1971  the  written  procedure  was  undertaken  3,061 
times and 3,426 times in 1972. 
Only issues of  some importance, therefore, actually figure 
on the agenda of the Commission itself, which meets each 
week for at least one whole day. 
When discussing particularly delicate matters, the mem-
bers of the Commission sit alone, with no officials present 
except the Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary-General. 
In other cases,  the officials  responsible  may  be called in. 
Although its decisions can be taken by a majority, many are 
in  fact  unanimous.  Where  a  vote  is  taken,  the  minority 
always  abides  by  the majority decision,  which  thereupon 
constitutes the stance of the whole Commission. 
How the Commission draws up its decisions and 
proposals 
The  Commission  proceeds  in  two  quite  different  ways, 
according as it is concerned to establish the broad outlines 
of the policy it intends to pursue in a particular .field, or to 
fix  the practical details· of that policy as well as of various 
measures of  a more technical nature, not so much connected 
with policy as such. 
In  establishing  actual  policy,  the  Commission,  after 
extensive  consultations  with  political  circles,  top  civil 
servants and employers' and workers' organizations, settles 
down to working out its final position with the assistance of 
its own departments only. This involves a series of  meetings, 
often numerous and prolonged, with weeks of careful con-
sideration intervening between  one reading and the next. 
It was  on this basis,  for instance,  that the merged  Com.-
mission  prepared  its  opinion  on  the  British  and  other 
applications for membership, its proposals on the reform of 
Community  agriculture,  and  its  recent  reports  on  the 
implementation  of the  policy  guidelines  laid  down at the 
Paris "Summit". 
Once the main lines of  its policy have been agreed, on the 
other hand, the Commission has systematic recourse to the 
.  cooperation  of experts  in  the  member  countries  in  the 
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to  be  adopted  or  the  proposals  to  be  submitted.  The 
appropriate Commission departments convene meetings of 
the experts designated by  the national civil service depart-
ments concerned, with a Commission official in the chair. 
The experts' contributions do not commit their respective 
Governments, but as they are sufficiently well-informed as 
to the latter's wishes  and general  position, they can give 
their  Commission  counterparts  all  relevant  guidance  in 
their efforts  to arrive  at formulas  calculated to meet  the 
requirements of the case and to be generally acceptable to 
the nine governments. 
There are a very great many of these meetings of experts, 
and consequently  more  and more  national  civil  servants 
every year are receiving what can fairly be called a European 
training, while at the same time a departmental-level dia-
logue is being carried on between European and government 
officials.  In  addition,  members  of the  Commission  or 
officials from their departments have regular meetings with 
leading representatives of trade unions, employers' federa-
tions,  farmers'  associations,  groups of dealers and so  on, 
formed in sets of six within the Community. 
Some of these meetings have been institutionalized: thus 
the Council, at the Commission's proposal, has set up, among 
others, a Short-Term Economic Policy Committee, a Budge-
tary-Policy Committee, a  Medium-Term Economic Policy 
Committee and a  Nuclear-Research Advisory Committee, 
consisting of high-level government representatives, and a 
Committee  on Vocational Training  and a  Committee  on 
the  Free  Movement of Workers,  and Social  Security  for 
Migrant Workers,  consisting of both government experts 
and representatives  of workers'  and employers'  organiza-
tions.  The Commission itself has established a number of 
advisory committees of the heads of all the representative 
bodies for a particular sector, to deal for example with the 
main agricultural production sectors or with certain specific 
social problems. 
In the final stage, the results of these various preparatory 
proceedings  are  laid  before  the  Commission,  which  then 
takes up its stand. Such is the process by which the Com-
mission frames its proposals for sending to the Council, and 
also, in many cases, regulations or decisions which it could 
issue  on  its  own  but  has  thought  well  to  prepare  with 
the cooperation of the member countries' own civil servants. 
How does the Council work  1 
Upon receiving from the Commission either a memorandum 
of general scope or a proposal on a particular point, the 
Council first has the matter gone into by the Committee of 
Permanent  Representatives  whose  role  has  already  been 
described and whose discussions are prepared by its many 
working groups or committees, some of  which are permanent 
bodies. 
The Council's decisions can be taken only by the ministers 
themselves. However, on less important matters, where the 
nine Permanent Representatives and the Commission's repre-
sentative  are  unanimously  agreed,  the  decision  will  be 
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adopted without debate. On the other hand, all important 
questions,  and  those  having  political  implications,  are 
discussed in detail in the Council between the ministers and 
the members of the Commission, who attend as of right: it 
is then that the procedures just described come into play. 
The Council's meetings are not merely a matter of form, 
as ministerial meetings in other international organizations 
sometimes are:  they  are working sessions  in  which  ding-
dong debate is sometimes the order of the day and the out-
come  may  well  hang long in the balance.  They  are con-
stantly being held, and often last some considerable time. 
In 1972, the Council held 39 meetings, taking 70 days in 
all.  Similarly  in  1972,  the  Permanent  Representatives' 
Committee  was  in  session  for  96  days  altogether,  at 43 
meetings. 
When  decision  is  impending  on  a  particularly  difficult 
problem,  the  Council  may  have  to  hold  a  "marathon''. 
Many people in the Communities remember the marathon 
on the agricultural regulations at the end of 1961 and begin-
ning of 1962, which lasted nearly three weeks. This was the 
longest occasion of its kind, but not the only one. 
Such then is the operation of the Council of Ministers and 
the  Commission,  and the  Community  generally.  Broadly 
summed  up,  the  mode  of approach  of the  Community 
Institutions may be  said to be characterized by  three out-
standing features.  · 
• Firstly, the Institutions, and the Commission in particular, 
are no ivory tower. On the contrary, they are a forum for 
constant exchanges of views and suggestions from govern-
ments and civil services, members of the European Parlia-
ment and representatives of associations and federations in 
the different sectors of the economy. 
•  Secondly, there are strict legal rules in force which have 
to be faithfully  obeyed, but at the same time the ongoing 
dialogue  in  progress  creates  the  necessary  Community-
mindedness and mutual trust to ensure the proper degree of 
flexibility. 
•  And lastly,  the  economic  interest  groups,  the  Parlia-
ment,  the  national  civil  services  and  the  ministers  have 
genuine confidence in the Commission's impartiality. 
Now that the Common Market and Euratom have been 
in  being for  15  years,  and the  European Coal and Steel 
Community for longer still, and have successfully weathered 
a number of crises, it is clear after three new member states 
have joined the Community that the Community system is 
in fact an effective one, and that its Institutions are firmly 
established and have taken root among the six nations. How 
fast it develops has of course always depended on how fast 
the  member governments and nations wish  it to develop. 
Nevertheless,  for  so  long  as  fulfilment  of their  Treaty 
obligations remains basic to the policy of them all, we may 
rest assured that whatever difficulties,  of whatever magni-
tude, may arise in the future can in the end be solved, and the 
Communities will remain at the heart of the future develop-
ment of European integration. 
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